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Abstract—More than 1000 distributed ledger projects raising
$600 billion in investments in 2016 feature the unprecedented and
disruptive potential of the blockchain technology. A systematic
analysis, comparison and rigorous evaluation of the different
design features of distributed ledgers and their implications in
performance and applications is a challenge. The fast evolving
blockchain landscape creates an increasing gap in a common
and comprehensive understanding of the techno-socio-economic
design space of distributed ledgers and their supported crypto-
economies. This paper contributes a conceptual architecture, a
taxonomy and a classification of 29 distributed ledger systems.
Compared to related work, the proposed taxonomy and classifi-
cation is highly comprehensive and robust as defined in earlier
taxonomy theory and validated in a crowd-sourced study using
blockchain community feedback to harvest the wisdom of the
crowd.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over 1000 distributed ledger systems have emerged in
the recent years raising investments of $600 billion in 2016
[1]. They empower a large spectrum of novel distributed
applications using data immutability, integrity, fair access,
transparency, non-repudiation of transactions [2] and crypto-
currencies. These applications range from improving supply-
chains [3], the creation of self-sovereign identities1 [4], peer-
to-peer energy markets [5], secure digital voting [6] to cross-
country financial transactions [2]. The most well-known dis-
tributed ledger technology (DLT) is Bitcoin, whose novel
consensus mechanism2 and cryptoeconomic design3 (CED)
empowers untrusted parties to reach consensus [7]. Bitcoin
is the first public distributed ledger system, which prevents
double-spending4 and sybill attacks5 [8].
A distributed ledger (DL) is a distributed data structure,
whose entries are written by the participants of a DLT system
1Decentralized identities, owned and controlled by the individual repre-
sented through the identity.
2Bitcoin uses a Nakamoto consensus, see Section IV-B.
3In particular, paying a block reward (Section IV-D) and transaction fees
(Section IV-B) to its consensus participants.
4Faulty transactions of the same token to two different receivers
5Setup of fake identities to insert faulty information into the distributed
ledger
after reaching consensus on the validity of the entries. A
consensus mechanism is usually an integral part of a dis-
tributed ledger system to guarantee system reliability: all
written entries are validated without a trusted third party.
Distributed ledgers are usually designed to support secure
cryptoeconomies which are capable of operating cross-border,
without depending on a certain political structure or legal
system. These cryptoeconomies rely on digital currencies
referred to as tokens and cryptographic techniques to regulate
how value exchange is performed between the participating
actors [9], [10]. The options and choices of a cryptoeconomy
are referred to as cryptoeconomic design (CED) that plays
a key role in the stability of a DLT system in terms of
convergence, liveness and fairness [7].
Keeping up with the pace of this rapidly evolving tech-
nological landscape is a challenge. One reason is the lack
of a common and insightful vocabulary that is earlier doc-
umented as a significant barrier [11]. Moreover, the plethora
of design options for distributed ledgers and their supported
cryptoeconomies have implications on performance and their
applicability [2] that have neither been systematically studied
nor rigorously formalized to guide researchers and practition-
ers to unravel new disruptive blockchain solutions [7], [12].
It has been argued that this can lead to fragmentation of
the blockchain community and duplication of efforts [13].
The significance of this challenge is reflected on the recent
taxonomies of distributed ledgers [2], [13], [14], [15].
In contrast to this earlier work, this paper introduces a
conceptual architecture based on which a comprehensive and
robust taxonomy is designed to classify 29 distributed ledger
systems. A novel evaluation methodology is employed that
engages the blockchain community and constructively uses
its feedback to validate and improve further the proposed
taxonomy and classification. In other words, the mapping of
the blockchain landscape is crowd-sourced to the blockchain
community itself to harvest the wisdom of the crowd.
The contributions of this paper are outlined as follows:
1) A conceptual architecture that models DLT systems into
four components. The architecture defines a minimal and
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insightful terminology to illustrate the inner mechanics
of distributed ledgers and the interrelationships of their
components.
2) A taxonomy of distributed ledgers that formalizes a set of
19 descriptive and qualitative attributes including a set of
defined characteristics for each attribute. They illustrate
in more detail the four DLT components (Figure 2) and
provide deeper insights to cryptoeconomic terms, such
as utility token, public blockchain, etc.
3) A classification of 29 DLT systems, including Bitcoin
and Ethereum, which are backed up by an extensive
literature review.
4) A taxonomy evaluation criterion referred to as ‘expres-
siveness’ designed from earlier theory on taxonomies.
5) A crowd-sourced evaluation feedback by blockchain
community to further assess and improve the taxonomy
and classification.
This paper is organized as follow: In Section II, terminology
and recent taxonomies for DLT systems are discussed. A con-
ceptual architecture for DLT systems is introduced in Section
III, while a taxonomy in Section IV. Thereafter, Section V
classifies 29 DLT systems based on the taxonomy. In Section
VI, the community evaluation by blockchain practitioners is
illustrated. Finally, in Section VII a conclusion is drawn and
an outlook presented.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
DLT systems use different types of distributed ledgers
as data structures. In particular, the literature distinguishes
between distributed ledgers (DL) and blockchains [2], [12], the
latter representing one way to implement the former. Another
type of a distributed ledger is the directed acyclic graph [14].
The entries of a distributed ledger contain transactions. Any
type of transaction can be stored, ranging from cryptographi-
cally signed financial transactions, to hashes of digital assets,
and Turing complete executable programs [2]. DLT systems
are able to define the access rights to these transactions:
they determine who can initiate transactions, write them to
the distributed ledger, and read them again from the ledger
[2]. In addition, they use the so called tokens [15], which are
identified as another key component of DLT systems, besides
the distributed ledger [19]. Hence, these components can be
modeled independently, resulting in systems, which do not
necessarily maintain a native distributed ledger, but only define
a token while using another system as their infrastructure for
a distributed ledger. For instance, the Aragon system does not
maintain a natively developed distributed ledger [20].
The capabilities to define the type of transactions, access
rights and tokens, are used to influence user behavior, i.e. by
limiting and granting access rights to system services or by in-
centivizing specific actions with tokens. These socio-economic
choices not only influence system stability, such as correctness,
liveness and fairness of the consensus mechanism [7], but
also determine the emergence of complex cryptoeconomies
[9], [10]. In other words, DLT systems reach stability and
empower economies via their cryptoeconomic design (CED).
A DLT system has first to reach consensus before a trans-
action can be permanently written onto its ledger [15]. This
consensus mechanism is a functional element of any DLT sys-
tem [12], as it enables a decentralized network to unanimously
take decisions about the validity of entries in the distributed
ledger [21]. In particular, in the context of DLT systems, the
consensus prevents double-spending of token units [22] and
Sybill attacks [8] that are the setup of fake identities to inject
faulty information into the distributed ledger.
Recent ontologies and taxonomies have been proposed to
structure and map DLT systems. A comparative summary of
earlier work is shown in Table I.
The criteira for the selection of the taxonomy attributes are
not clearly determined. Only Paper 4 in Table I provides a
conceptual framing (Column 3 in Table I), which motivates the
choice of some attributes. More specifically, it distinguishes
between on-chain and off-chain aspects [15]: components of
the DLT system which exist on the distributed ledger (e.g.
permission management) vs. components which exist outside
(e.g. control, data).
The number of attributes across the papers varies consid-
erably, from 4 to 30 attributes (Column 4 in Table I). One
explanation is that the papers focus on different aspects of a
DLT system and thus study different (sub) sets of attributes.
For instance, Yeow et. al [14] (Paper 5 in Table I) focus on
Internet of Things applications of DLT systems and only use
four attributes, whereas Tasca et. al (Paper 1 in Table I) design
a taxonomy to model all types of DLT systems and hence use
30 attributes [13]. Several of the attributes potentially have
conceptual overlaps that stem from the lack of a supported
conceptual architecture.
Consensus is identified as a core feature of DLT sys-
tems [21] and as such it is incorporated in all papers of Table I.
For this reason it is omitted from this table. Nevertheless, only
three papers consider incentivization schemes, with which par-
ticipation in the consensus mechanism is motivated (Column
5 in Table I).
Moreover, only Paper 3 and 5 distinguish different types of
distributed ledgers (Column 6 in Table I). For instance, Xu.
et al. differentiate between blockchains and directed acyclic
graphs [2]. Nevertheless, some of the most recent contributions
only include blockchain-type DLT systems [2], [13], [16].
Five papers include cryptoeconomic design in their taxon-
omy (Column 8 in Table I). In particular, four papers consider
the access rights to transactions (Column 8 in Table I) that
also plays a key role in cryptoeconomic design. Only Paper 1
includes tokens and their properties in its taxonomy (Column
9 in Table I).
Paper 5 in Table I illustrates the classification of 28 DLT
systems based on a proposed taxonomy (Column 10 in Table
I). The authors relied on three attributes: data structure, scal-
able consensus ledger and transaction model [14]. However,
they have not introduced formal criteria for the selection of
the 28 DLT systems.
How effective and useful a taxonomy is usually depends
on qualitative criteria studied in taxonomy theory [23] as well
TABLE I
COMPERATIVE OVERVIEW OF EARLIER WORK OUTLINING THE LANDSCAPE OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS.
ID Paper Concept Attributes ConsensusIncentivization
Diff.
DL CED
Access rights to
transactions
Token
properties Classification
Community
Evaluation
1 Tasca et. al (2017) [13] - 30 yes - yes yes yes - -
2 Comuzzi et. al (2018) [16] - 8 yes - yes yes - - -
3 Xu et. al (2017) [2] - 13 - yes yes yes - - -
4 Xu et. al (2016) [15] yes 7 - - yes yes - - -
5 Yeow et. al (2018) [14] - 4 - yes - - - yes -
6 Okada et. al (2017) [17] - 4 yes - yes - - - -
7 De Kruijff et. al (2017) [18] - 6 (many) - - - - - - -
This paper yes 19 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
as on the expert’s knowledge who is the one designing the
taxonomy. Another approach is to study more quantitatively
the quality of a taxonomy based on crowd-sourced community
feedback and the wisdom of the crowd. This is particularly
relevant in the case of DLT systems and the blockchain
community. The latter is the one shaping the blockchain land-
scape and therefore harvesting feedback can provide invaluable
new insights about the design of distributed ledgers. Such an
endeavor has not been pursued so far as shown in Column 10
of Table I.
The most comprehensive taxonomy, introduced by Tasca
et al. [13], is worth a brief discussion. This taxonomy for
DLT systems consist of eight components having a total of
30 attributes. It includes CED with three components: Native
currencies/tokenisation, identity management and charging as
well as rewarding system. In particular, access rights to
transactions and the properties of a token are discussed.
Access rights to the consensus and its incentivization are
also illustrated. Despite the extensive coverage of relevant
concepts, this taxonomy lacks a conceptual architecture con-
necting the elements, e.g. no information is given how the
eight components relate to each other. Moreover, it remains
unclear based on which criteria the authors introduce these
eight components and 30 attributes. In addition, the distinction
of CED from DL is not explicitly made as well as which
of the components concern on-chain and which off-chain
aspects. More particularly, this taxonomy does not differentiate
between different types of distributed ledgers. This limits the
option of a more granular differentiation of distributed ledgers
that is a quality indicator for taxonomies as shown in Section
VI-D.
In summary, a few observations can be made about the
current state of the art on DLT system taxonomies. First, they
predominantly focus on the DL and consensus mechanisms,
while largely neglecting cryptoeconomics and token design,
despite their significant role on system stability [7]. Second,
they are usually not based on a conceptual architecture from
which to derive the interrelationships of the different compo-
nents as well as better interpretations of the different design
choices. Third, none of the papers, except one, classifies real
world DLT systems. This is a missed opportunity to validate
the classification capacity of any proposed taxonomy. Last but
not least, none of the proposed taxonomies is systematically
exposed to feedback from blockchain practitioners. This com-
plementary external validation promises richer, more unbiased
and applicable taxonomies, especially at this early stage of the
rapidly evolving DLT domain.
This paper addresses all of the aforementioned limitations
identified in literature and contributes a new expressive tax-
onomy, built on a solid conceptual architecture, assessed via
classifications and validated by feedback from the blockchain
community. In particular, the classification is a proof of
concept for the applicability and effectiveness of the devel-
oped taxonomy, as it demonstrates the expressiveness6 of the
taxonomy to differentiate and classify DLT systems.
.
III. CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE
By studying 29 DLT systems that academic literature cov-
ered at time of writing this paper (c.f. Table IV), a conceptual
architecture7 is introduced in this section. The architecture
contains a set of four key components, their interrelationships
and embodiment into the distributed ledger design space. The
architecture is depicted in Figure 1. The four components are
illustrated in the rest of this section.
Action component. A human or machine actor performs an
action in the real world (Arrow (A) in Figure 1), for example
planting a tree or doing a monetary transaction. Here, at the
border between real world and digital world, the action gets a
digital representation, which is referred to as claim.
Consensus component. Claims are broadcast to all nodes in
the network that can participate in the consensus mechanism
(Arrow (B)). These nodes (referred to as miners in Bitcoin or
minters in Peercoin) collect these claims for writing them to
the distributed ledger.
Distributed ledger component. Only at this point, the actual
distributed ledger (or blockchain in the case of blockchain-type
DLT systems) comes into play. Participants of the consensus
combine these claims to entries (referred to as blocks in
Bitcoin) and write them to the distributed ledger (Arrow (C)).
This representation of the claim on the distributed ledger is
called a transaction. Transactions and objects existing on the
distributed ledger are referred to as on-chain, in contrast to off-
chain objects, existing on the consensus or action component.
6Expressiveness is formally defined in Section VI-D based on earlier
taxonomy theory.
7ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2011 standard [24]
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Fig. 1. An overview of the conceptual architecture with four key concepts of DLT systems and their relationship: action, consensus, distributed ledger and
token.
Token component. Token creation depends on whether an
incentive system is part of the DLT system. If it is, there are
two options: token units are given as rewards to nodes, who
are either involved in the consensus (Arrow (D)) or an action
(Arrow (E)). While the inherent properties of such tokens (e.g.
whether supply is capped or not) are determined by the design
of the DLT system, the value given to token units is backed
by underlyings, cryptoeconomic assets which can reside on-
chain (Arrow (F), for example other tokens or executable
code) or off-chain (Arrow (G), for example goods, services
or commodities).
Example Ethereum. It is shown here how the identified
components interact using a well-known DLT system. In
Ethereum, one type of action is the deployment of a piece of
code (Arrow (A) in Figure 1), a smart contract. These actions
are collected by miners (Arrow (B)) and written as a block
to the Ethereum distributed ledger (Arrow (C)). A miner, who
successfully writes a block, obtains Ether, newly created token
units as an incentive to mine (Arrow (D)). The Ether token
has inherent properties, e.g. it has an uncapped supply. It also
has value because it enables its owner to access the on-chain
computational power of the Ethereum network (Arrow (F)).
IV. TAXONOMY
Based on the conceptual architecture of Section III, a tax-
onomy is designed, using the method proposed by Nickerson
et al. [23].
The taxonomy positions the four components of Section III
across two dimensions to classify DLT systems (Figure 2). The
first dimension concerns system design aspects related to the
distributed ledger technology (DLT) – distributed ledger com-
ponent, consensus component –, while the second concerns
cryptoeconomic design aspects (CED) – action component and
Token component.
Fig. 2. Overview of the taxonomy, depicting the two dimensions of DLT and
CED, its four components and 19 attributes.
A. Distributed Ledger
Definition 1. A distributed ledger is defined as a distributed
data structure, whose entries are digital records of actions.
In the Bitcoin system, an entry in the data structure is
called block. In the IOTA system, it is called bundle. An
entry contains a set of transactions (Figure 1, distributed ledger
component). In Bitcoin, these transactions represent exchange
of currency value.
The attributes of the distributed ledger are type, origin,
address traceability and Turing completeness.
1) Type: illustrates the data structure of the distributed
ledger. Type has the characteristics blockchain, directed
acyclic graph (DAG) or other.
The most well known type is the blockchain; an immutable
and append-only linked list, which has a total order of ele-
ments. Several systems use blockchains, such as Bitcoin [2],
Ethereum [25] or Litecoin [26].
In contrast to these systems, IOTA uses a directed acyclic
graph [14]. This data structure is no longer a linked list, but
a directed graph with no cycles, leading to a partial order of
elements. Moreover, Ripple neither uses a blockchain nor a
directed acyclic graph, but operates on other consensus based
accounting mechanism [27].
2) Origin: defines the ownership of the distributed ledger.
It has the characteristic native, if the distributed ledger is
maintained by and for the system itself or external, if the
system uses a distributed ledger from another DLT system.
The level of ownership varies between the different DLT
systems. Bitcoin develops and maintains its distributed ledger
natively, likewise NXT [15]. In contrast, Aragon [20], Augur
[28] [27] and Counterparty [14] do not maintain a native
distributed ledger, they use Ethereum or Bitcoin as an infras-
tructure. Systems can use a hybrid approach. Factom combines
a natively developed concept of a blockchain and its own
consensus mechanism with the Bitcoin blockchain [2].
3) Address traceability: shows the extent to which different
transactions, originating from or incoming at the same chain
identity, can be linked together. It has the characteristic ob-
fuscatable, if the distributed ledger has mechanisms in place
to hide such links and linkable if links can be inferred with
some computational effort.
The level of address traceability varies between the different
DLT systems. Zcash [2] and Monero [13] are so called privacy
coins, which perform advanced measures to unlink transac-
tions [7]. Hence, the on-chain identities of the actors remain
obfuscated. Bitcoin has a linkable address traceability [29]. In
theory, transactions cannot be linked to a chain identity, but
it is shown, that with some computational effort this can be
actually achieved [2]. The same linkability property holds for
Ripple [30].
4) Turing completeness: determines whether a Turing ma-
chine can be simulated by the DL. It has the characteristic Yes
or No.
Some DLs can execute Turing machines. Ethereum is an
example of these. It allows for the storage and execution of
Turing complete smart contracts [15], in contrast to the Bitcoin
blockchain [29].
5) Storage: determines if additional data can be stored on
the distributed ledger besides default transaction information.
The characteristics are yes, if data can be stored and no, if
no additional data can be stored.
The distributed ledger of Bitcoin allows for the storage of
arbitrary data inside of transactions. This allows Bitcoin to be
used as a first layer system, see Section IV-E, which is done
by Counterparty [14]. In contrast to Bitcoin, IOTA does not
allow for such an additional storage of data [31].
B. Consensus
Definition 2. Consensus is the mechanism of writing entries
to the distributed ledger, adhering to a set of rules that all
participants of the consensus enforce when an entry containing
transactions is validated.
The attributes of consensus are type, proof, write permission,
validator permission and fee.
1) Type: shows whether the consensus is deterministic or
probabilistic. Hence, its characteristics are: deterministic, if
consensus is found in guaranteed finite amount of time or
probabilistic, if consensus is found with some uncertainty.
Most DLT systems use the Nakamoto consensus [2], a
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithm. This type of
algorithms tolerate a class of system failures that belong to
the Byzantine Generals Problem[32]. In particular, a consensus
algorithm having this property prevents consensus participants
to write a false transaction to the distributed ledger.
In contrast to other BFT algorithms, the Nakamoto consen-
sus is probabilistic. This type of algorithm validates a new
entry by utilizing the whole history of previous entries: An
entry is accepted as confirmed if and only if there is a certain
number of new entries referencing it [7]. For instance, in
Bitcoin, a writer validates a transaction by considering the
whole blockchain and includes then the transaction into a new
block. As soon as this block gets referenced by six blocks,
it is confirmed, as the probability that a second chain of six
blocks referencing each other, but not referencing this block,
is low [2]. Likewise, in the directed acyclic graph of IOTA
an entry is confirmed, when it is referenced by a significant
number of new entries [14]. On the other hand, Ripple does
not use a Nakamoto consensus for its algorithm. Its consensus
is found in guaranteed finite amount of time [21].
2) Proof: is the evidence with which a consensus is found.
It has the characteristics: proof-of-work (PoW), if it is de-
livered by utilizing processing power of computers; proof-of-
stake (PoS), if it is delivered by voting linked to (economic)
power in the system; hybrid, if it is a combination of the
previous two or other, if another form of proof is required.
The proof is required by the consensus participants to accept
the validity of an entry. Bitcoin uses a proof-of-work [15],
which is the solution to a mathematical puzzle requiring the
processing power of computers. A proof-of-stake is used by
Ardor [13], which is the signature of a randomly selected
consensus participant requiring the participant to hold a stake
in Ardor token units.
3) Write permission: illustrates who is allowed to write en-
tries to the distributed ledger. The characteristics are restricted,
if participation is restricted or public otherwise.
The Bitcoin consensus mechanism is public [15], it allows
everyone having computing power to participate [21]. On the
other hand, the consensus mechanism of Ripple is restricted
[15], it has a few trusted institutions, which perform consensus,
and hence not everyone can participate [14].
4) Validate permission: shows who is allowed to validate
claims before they are written to the distributed ledger. The
characteristics are: restricted, if participation is restricted and
public otherwise.
In Bitcoin, the writers validate claims for correctness, uti-
lizing the proof, before they write them to a block, hence
the validator permission is also public. In contrast, in IOTA
a central entity, the coordinator, validates transactions before
they are collected in an entry and written to the directed acyclic
graph [14].
5) Fee: shows whether participants of the consensus (writ-
ers and validators) are paid a fee for writing new entries to
the distributed ledger. The characteristics are yes and no.
In contrast to Bitcoin, where writers/ validators are rewarded
with fees [21], in IOTA the writers and validators receive no
fees [14]. In Ripple no fees are rewarded to the consensus
participants, although the actors have to pay a fee [33].
C. Action
Definition 3. An action is one or more real-life activities,
which can be digitally represented by a DLT system as a
transaction.
In this sense, a transaction represents digitally a real-life
action. The attributes of action are actor permission, read
permission and fee.
1) Actor permission: illustrates who can perform an action.
The characteristics are restricted, if actors have to fulfill spe-
cial requirements before performing actions in these systems
or public, if anyone can perform actions.
Bitcoin allows everyone to create a private key to send/
receive token units [13], hence it has a public actor permission.
Ripple uses restricted access rights. In order to comply with
regulations (e.g. know-your-customer), actors need to register
[13].
2) Read permission: illustrates the scope of actors who can
read contents of transactions from the distributed ledger.
The characteristics are: restricted, if permission is precon-
ditioned, or public, if permission is not restricted.
Most DLT systems have a public read access in the sense
that everyone can read the content of occurred actions, e.g.
the amount of transferred bitcoins [13]. Privacy coins often
restrict read access to actors of the transaction (e.g. Zcash [2]),
usually by making an effort to hide the amount of transfered
token units [7].
3) Fee: shows whether the actor has to pay a fee for
performing an action that is not related to the consensus. The
characteristics are yes or no.
Some DLT systems require actors to pay a consensus-
independent fee, before they can store an action on the
distributed ledger. For instance, actors have to pay a fee in
Augur, which is not paid to the consensus participants [28].
In Bitcoin no additional fee is required to perform an action,
except the one paid to the consensus participants. Also Ripple
requires actors to pay a fee per action, which is not paid to
consensus participants, but is destroyed [33].
D. Token
Definition 4. Token is a unit of value issued within a DLT
system and which can be used as a medium of exchange or
unit of account.
Its attributes are supply property, burn property, conditional
creation, unconditional creation, onchain underlying, offchain
underlying.
1) Supply property: illustrates the total quantity of token
units made available. The characteristics are capped, if the
total supply is bound by a finite number and uncapped
otherwise.
Under increasing demand for a currency, a capped supply
can result in an appreciation of the currency and to a deflation
of prices denominated in it. Moreover, it can result in an
appreciated exchange rate with other currencies, which in turn
increase the stability of a DLT system [7]. Bitcoin has a capped
supply of 21 million units [13], whereas Dodgecoin does not
have an upper limit [29].
2) Burn property: illustrates whether token supply is re-
duced by removing token units. The characteristics are yes or
no.
Some DLT systems destroy token units that is a processed
referred to as ‘burn’. This decrease in money supply, while
observing a constant demand results in an appreciation of
the token units and hence, a better exchange rate with other
currencies. For example in Ripple, paid fees are removed from
the total supply and are not returned [33]. In contrast, Bitcoin
has no inherent destruction mechanism of its token units.
3) Transferability: determines, if the ownership of a token
unit can be changed. The characteristics are transferable, if
the token can be transfered and non-transferable otherwise.
Bitcoin token units can be transfered between different
actors. Akasha plans to use non-transferable reputation tokens,
so called Mana and Essence [34].
4) Conditional creation: illustrates how the creation of new
token units is bound to incentivize the consensus and/ or an
action. The characteristics are: consensus, if creation is bound
to the consensus, action, if the creation is bound to an action,
both, if the creation is bound to the consensus as well as the
action and none otherwise.
In Bitcoin, new tokens are created by incentivizing the
consensus mechanism [2]. Other systems create new tokens
by incentivizing an action. For instance, in Steemit new steem
is created by incentivizing content creation on the platform
(e.g. writing blog articles) [35]. Moreover, Ripple does not
use its token to incentivize the consensus or an action [36].
Furthermore, hybrid versions are possible, where new tokens
are created by incentivizing the consensus and an action. For
instance, newly created token units in the DASH system are
awarded both to the consensus participants and the master
nodes, which perform actions such as mixing transactions to
enable an obfuscatable address traceability [37].
5) Unconditional creation: illustrates the amount of new
token units that are created independent of incentivizing the
consensus or an action. The characteristics are partially, if
some tokens are created independently, all, if all tokens are
created independently (e.g. 100 % pre-mined tokens) or none
otherwise.
At genesis of the Bitcoin system, no token units are
previously mined and all tokens come into existence by
incentivizing the consensus [7] (characteristic: none). On the
other hand, all Ripple tokens are created during the genesis
of the system (characteristic: all). In Augur, some tokens are
created during the genesis of the system [28] (characteristic:
partially).
6) Underlying: illustrates where the source of value lies
and what it constitutes of.
The characteristics are distributed ledger, if the token gives
access to the distributed ledger, e.g. if the token is needed
in order to use the storage or computing capacity of the
distributed ledger; consensus, if the token gives access to
the consensus mechanism, e.g. proof-of-stake; action, if the
token gives access to perform or receive actions or services
in the DLT system; token, if the token gives access to another
token; physical asset, if the token gives access to goods or
commodities external to the DLT system; none, if the token
has no underlying.
The first two characteristics (distributed ledger and token)
are considered to be on-chain and the other three are consid-
ered to be off-chain underlyings of a token unit (as depicted
in Figure 1).
The Ethereum token allows everyone to store data or
smart-contracts on-chain [2] and to access in this way the
distributed ledger of the network. Hence Ether token units
give access to the processing power of the distributed ledger,
which gives value to the token units. In contrast to Ether, the
Golem network token units allow holders to access off-chain
computations [27]. Thus its underlying is an action as the
token gives access to computing actions in the DLT System.
The Storj Token allows users to access off-chain storage [13]
and hence to perform a storage action. Siacoin allows for the
storage of arbitrary data on both its distributed ledger [38]
and its off-chain network [39]. Hence its underlying is the
distributed ledger and action.
E. Cryptoeconomic Reasoning using Boolean Algebra
The introduced taxonomy allows for a more systematic
definition of widely used yet not clearly defined terms in
the field of DLT systems by combining specific taxonomy
attribute characteristics with operators from boolean algebra.
As illustrated in Table II, one can reason about terms such
as permissioned/ permissionless blockchains, as well as asset/
utility tokens.
TABLE II
FORMAL DEFINITIONS ABOUT DLT SYSTEMS BY REASONING USING
BOOLEAN ALGEBRA AND THE PROPOSED TAXONOMY.
System Term Formal Definition
Blockchain blockchain type
1st layer native ownership
2nd layer external ownership
Permissioned restricted write permission OR
restricted validator permission
Permissionless public write permission AND
public validator permission
Public 〈permissionless DLT system〉 AND
public actor permission
Private 〈permissioned DLT system〉 AND
restricted actor permission
Privacy obfuscatable traceability AND
〈public DLT System〉
Infrastructure yes turing completeness OR
yes storage
Blockchain-as-a-Service @ action component attribute AND
@ token component attribute
Cryptoeconomic Term
Utility distributed ledger underlying OR
action underlying
Asset token underlying OR
physical good underlying
Payment yes transferability
In particular, the latter pair has been identified by the swiss
financial market supervisory authority FINMA as important
for the decision if a token is classified as a security. Such a
treatment is of interest for market participants, because it has
regulatory implications [40].
V. CLASSIFICATION
Twenty-nine DLT systems are classified according to the
introduced taxonomy. The criterion for the selection is, that
they are cited in academic literature.
The classification is given for each of the four components
separately in the next subsections. A summary can be found in
Tables III, IV, V, VI. The entries, i.e. attribute values, of the
tables are accompanied with citations, if they are justified in
academic literature. At least one entry per system is referenced
in literature that is the criterion for the inclusion of a DLT
system. All other information is derived from the DLT systems
whitepapers or other web sources, such as the DLT system
websites. All DLT system websites are cited in the second
column of each of the Tables III, IV, V, VI.
A. Distributed Ledger
Table III shows 29 DLT systems classified according to the
attributes of the distributed ledger component. Seven systems
TABLE III
SYSTEMS CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE DISTRIBUTED-LEDGER COMPONENT
ID DLT System Origin Type
Address
Traceability
Turing
Completeness
Storage
1 Aragon [41] External (Ethereum) [20] - - - -
2 Ripple [42] Native [7] Other [27] Linkable [30] No Yes
3 Peercoin [43] Native [13] Blockchain [14] linkable No Yes
4 Monero [44] Native [13] Blockchain [25] Obfuscatable [13] No Yes
5 Hyperledger (Fabric) [45] Native [14] Other Linkable [21] Yes [14], [21] Yes
6 Dash [46] Native [13] Blockchain [25] Obfuscatable No Yes
7 Augur [47] External (Ethereum) [28] [27] - - - -
8 Dogecoin [48] Native Blockchain Linkable No Yes
9 Zcash [49] Native Blockchain [25] Obfuscatable [2] [50] No Yes
10 EOS [51] Native Blockchain Linkable Yes Yes
11 Byteball [52] Native [14] DAG [14] Obfuscatable No Yes
12 Golem [53] External (Ethereum) - - - -
13 Stellar [54] Native [14] Other Linkable No Yes
14 Factom [55] Hybrid (Bitcoin) [15] [2] Blockchain Linkable No Yes
15 Namecoin [56] Native Blockchain Linkable No Yes
16 Omni [57] External (Bitcoin) [15] - - - -
17 Storj [58] External (Ethereum) - - - -
18 Sia [59] Native Blockchain Linkable No Yes
19 SafeNetwork [60] Native Other Linkable Yes Yes
20 Blockstack Core [61] Hybrid (Bitcoin) Blockchain Linkable No Yes
21 Filecoin [62] Native Blockchain Linkable Yes Yes
22 Ethereum [63] Native [15] Blockchain [25] Linkable Yes [7] [25] Yes
23 Corda [64] Native Other Obfuscatable Yes [21] Yes
24 Counterparty [65] External (Bitcoin) [7] [14] - - - -
25 Enigma [66] External (Ethereum) - - - -
26 IOTA [67] Native DAG Linkable No [14] No
27 Litecoin [68] Native [13] Blockchain [25] [26] Linkable No Yes
28 Bitcoin [69] Native Blockchain [2] [12] Linkable [7] [13] No [15] [7] Yes
29 Ardor [70] Native Blockchain Linkable No Yes
do not maintain their own DL. Hence the attributes type, read
permission, address traceability and turing completeness are
not specified for these, as the characteristics can be determined
from the DL of the infrastructure8 system.
Fifteen systems use a blockchain, two systems use a directed
acyclic graph and five systems use another type of consensus
based accounting mechanism. All 2nd layer systems as defined
in Table II use a blockchain type system as an infrastructure.
This is possibly because both, the first DLT system (Bitcoin)
and the most widely-used DLT system that supports Turing
complete smart contracts (Ethereum), are blockchain type
systems [2] [15].
Seventeen distributed ledgers are linkable. These are sys-
tems which do not hide interactions of actors on the distributed
ledger. DLT systems focusing on privacy, such as Zcash
(System 7 in Table III), hide interactions between nodes with
public addresses. Hence they allow their actors an anonymous
8Refer to Table II for a definition of infrastructure DLT system
participation, if they combine it with a public actor permission
(see Section V-C). Some DLs allow to store and execute Turing
complete code. Ethereum (System 22 in Table III) is the most
widely used system enabling this [2]. In total there are six
DLT systems in the classification having a Turing complete
distributed ledger. Three of these are Blockchain systems and
three are classified as other. No Turing complete directed
acyclic graph has been identified among these DLT systems.
All systems, except for IOTA, allow the storing of additional
data on the distributed ledger. For instance, this enables Bitcoin
to function as an infrastructure blockchain for systems such
as Counterparty.
B. Consensus
Table IV depicts the classification of the systems according
to the consensus component. Systems, which do not maintain
their own DL, do not also maintain a consensus mechanism,
and hence have no attributes specified.
TABLE IV
SYSTEMS CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE CONSENSUS COMPONENT
ID DLT System
Consensus
Type
Proof
Write
Permission
Validator
Permission
Fee
1 Aragon [41] - - - - -
2 Ripple [42] Deterministic [21] [15] Other Restricted [2] [14] Restricted No
3 Peercoin [43] Probabilistic Hybrid [13], [14] Public [14] Public No
4 Monero [44] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
5 Hyperledger (Fabric) [45] Deterministic [13] [14] Other Restricted [71], [72] Restricted No
6 Dash [46] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
7 Augur [47] - - - - -
8 Dogecoin [48] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
9 Zcash [49] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
10 EOS [51] Deterministic [73] PoS [73] Restricted Restricted No
11 Byteball [52] Deterministic [14] Other [14] Public Restricted Yes [14]
12 Golem [53] - - - - -
13 Stellar [54] Deterministic [2], [21] Other Restricted [13] [14] Restricted No
14 Factom [55] Probabilistic Other Restricted Restricted No
15 Namecoin [56] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
16 Omni [57] - - - - -
17 Storj [58] - - - - -
18 Sia [59] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
19 SafeNetwork [60] Deterministic Other Restricted Restricted No
20 Blockstack Core [61] Probabilistic Other Unkown Unkown Unkown
21 Filecoin [62] Probabilistic Other Public Public Yes
22 Ethereum [63] Probabilistic PoW [2] [14] Public [15] [14] Public Yes [15]
23 Corda [64] Deterministic Other Restricted Restricted No
24 Counterparty [65] - - - - -
25 Enigma [66] - - - - -
26 IOTA [67] Probabilistic [14] PoW [14] Public [14] Restricted No [14]
27 Litecoin [68] Probabilistic PoW Public Public Yes
28 Bitcoin [69] Probabilistic [7] [2] PoW [15] [21] Public [15] [21] Public Yes [15] [21]
29 Ardor [70] Probabilistic PoS Public Public yes
It is observed, that all permissionless systems use a prob-
abilistic consensus. On the other hand, systems which have
a restricted write and/or validate permission (permissioned
system) and hence use a limited set of trusted third parties in
their system, usually adopt a deterministic consensus (except
System 14 and 26 in Table IV).
Both systems using a directed acyclic graph have a restricted
validate permission. A permissionless directed acyclic graph
is not apparent in literature during the writing of this paper.
All permissionless systems use consensus related fees.
These are used to incentivize the writers and validators to
participate in the consensus. Permissioned systems with the
exception of one, Byteball (System 12 in Table IV), do not
utilize consensus related fees. This is because these systems
do not rely on anonymous participants for their consensus
mechanism, but on trusted third parties.
C. Action
In Table V the classification of the systems for the action
component is depicted. Two systems are blockchain-as-a-
service, which provide distributed ledger services for other
systems, but do not maintain a live instance of a distributed
ledger. Thus, these systems do not deal with cryptoeconomic
design decisions and hence have no specification for these
attributes of the action component.
All other systems, except for two, have a public actor
permission. For instance, Ripple does not provide everyone
with system access, as it complies with Know-your-Customer
regulations [13].
Systems with a focus on privacy usually restrict the read
access of the transactions content hence (partially) restrict the
access for third-parties to knowing what actions are performed
by other actors.
TABLE V
SYSTEMS CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE ACTION COMPONENT
ID DLT System
Actor
Permission
Read
Permission
Action
Fee
1 Aragon [41] Public Public Yes
2 Ripple [42] Restricted [13] Restricted [13] Yes
3 Peercoin [43] Public Public Yes [13]
4 Monero [44] Public Restricted No
5 Hyper. (F.) [45] - Restricted [21] -
6 Dash [46] Public Public Yes
7 Augur [47] Public [28] Public Yes [28]
8 Dogecoin [48] Public Public No
9 Zcash [49] Public Restricted [2] No
10 EOS [51] Public Restricted No [73]
11 Byteball [52] Public Restricted No
12 Golem [53] Public Public Yes
13 Stellar [54] Restricted [13] Public Yes [13]
14 Factom [55] Public Public Yes
15 Namecoin [56] Public Public No
16 Omni [57] Public Public Yes
17 Storj [58] Public Public Yes
18 Sia [59] Public Public Yes
19 SafeNetwork [60] Public Public No
20 Blockstack C. [61] Public Public Yes
21 Filecoin [62] Public Public Yes
22 Ethereum [63] Public Public No
23 Corda [64] - Restricted -
24 Counterparty [65] Public Public Yes
25 Enigma [66] Public Restricted [13] Yes [15]
26 IOTA [67] Public Public No
27 Litecoin [68] Public Public No
28 Bitcoin [69] Public [13] Public [13] No
29 Ardor [70] Public Public No
Fourteen systems require actors to pay an unrelated con-
sensus fee for performing actions, i.e. Ripple (System 2 in
Table V). It burns the fees as a spam protection, whereas
Aragon (System 1 in Table V) collects fees from its network
participants to maintain the network. These fees are not
rewarded to participants of the consensus mechanism.
D. Token
Table VI depicts the classification for the token component.
In case a system uses several tokens in its CED, only the main
token for the operation of the system is classified.
Two systems do not have their own token. These are
blockchain-as-a-service systems, which do not deal with cryp-
toeconomic design, but allow their users to define their own
tokens on top of their distributed ledger (see Figure 1).
Seventeen systems capped the supply of token units to a
finite number. Seven systems have an inherent burn mechanism
implemented in their token. All of the classified tokens are
transferable. In non academic literature the concept of non
transferability is already discussed: Akasha plans to use non
transferable reputation tokens, the so called Mana and Essence
[34].
Fifteen systems incentivize participants of the consensus via
rewarding them with newly mined token units of the system.
All except one are blockchain based systems (System 19 in
Table IV), only two of them use a deterministic consensus
mechanism (System 10 and 19 in Table IV) and three of them
are permissioned systems (System 10, 14 and 19 in Table IV).
Seven systems create new token units to incentivize an
action. All of these systems are either a 1st layer DLT
system as defined in Table II with a distributed ledger of
type blockchain or use such a blockchain type system as an
infrastructure. Nine systems bind the creation of new token
units exclusively to incentivize an action or consensus. All
of these systems are blockchain based systems. Ten systems
create some token units unconditionally and eight systems
create all units unconditionally. Only half of those that create
all token units unconditionally are blockchain based, despite
making up 75% of the overall classified systems.
This paper identifies two mechanisms to incentivize partic-
ipation in the consensus mechanism: Consensus related trans-
action fees and block rewards, namely awarding token units
to consensus participants. Bitcoin was the first DLT system
to enable reaching consensus between untrusted parties [7]
using both of these incentive mechanisms. This has influenced
further developments in the field and hence, only two of the
permissionless systems differ from this approach. All sys-
tems which use both incentive mechanisms are permissionless
blockchain systems.
Eighteen tokens give access to the distributed ledger, seven-
teen tokens give access to actions and two tokens give access
to the consensus of the DLT system. One token does not give
access to any underlying.
VI. EVALUATION
The taxonomy (Section IV) and the classification of the
initial set of DLT systems (Section V) is evaluated by feedback
from the blockchain community. Participants were identified
via their contributions to Github9 repositories of DLT systems
and their official websites. Participants received a personalized
email invitation to a scientific survey with both a classification
of their own DLT system and the taxonomy. A total of 209
invitations were sent out from which 56 practitioners in the
field responded (response rate 26.8%). Thirty-six of those
finished the survey (17.2%). The responses were collected
during a period of three month, starting from the 22nd of March
2018.
The feedback resulted in adjustments of the classification
and taxonomy that are illustrated in Section VI-C. The original
version can be found in the supplementary material. The
rationale behind the incorporation of the community feedback
is explained in the following sections and in the supplementary
material.
9Available at https://github.com (last accessed: October 2018).
TABLE VI
SYSTEMS CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE TOKEN COMPONENT
ID DLT System Token Name
Supply
Property
Burn
Property
Transferability
Conditional
Creation
Unconditional
Creation
Underlying
1 Aragon [41] ANT Capped Yes Transferable Action Partially Action [20]
2 Ripple [42] Ripple Capped Yes Transferable None All DL, Action
3 Peercoin [43] Peercoin Uncapped Yes Transferable Consensus None DL, Consensus
4 Monero [44] Monero Uncapped No Transferable Consensus None DL
5 Hyperledger (F.) [45] - - - - - - -
6 Dash [46] Dash Capped No Transferable Both None DL, Action
7 Augur [47] Reputation Capped No Transferable Action [28] Partially [28] Action [28]
8 Dogecoin [48] Dodgecoin Uncapped [13] No Transferable Consensus None DL
9 Zcash [49] Zcash Capped No Transferable Consensus Partially DL
10 EOS [51] EOS Uncapped No Transferable Consensus Partially DL [73]
11 Byteball [52] GByte Capped [14] No Transferable None All DL
12 Golem [53] GNT Capped No Transferable None All Action [27]
13 Stellar [54] Lumen Uncapped No Ttransferable None All DL, Action
14 Factom [55] Factoids Uncapped Yes Transferable Consensus Partially DL, Action [15]
15 Namecoin [56] Namecoin Capped Yes Transferable Consensus None DL, Action [7] [74]
16 Omni [57] Omni Capped Yes Transferable Action None Action
17 Storj [58] Storj Capped No Transferable None All Action [71] [74]
18 Sia [59] Siacoin Uncapped Yes Transferable Consensus Partially DL, Action [39] [74]
19 SafeNetwork [60] SafeCoin Capped Yes Transferable Consensus Partially Action [74]
20 Blockstack C. [61] Stacks Uncapped No Transferable Both Partially DL, Action [71] [74]
21 Filecoin [62] Filecoin Capped No Transferable Both Partially DL, Action [71] [74]
22 Ethereum [63] Ether Uncapped No Transferable Consensus [25] Partially DL [25] [75]
23 Corda [64] - - - - - - -
24 Counterparty [65] Counterparty Capped Yes Transferable Action [2] [15] None Action
25 Enigma [66] Enigma Capped No Transferable None All Action [71] [76]
26 IOTA [67] MIOTA Capped [14] No Transferable None All None
27 Litecoin [68] Litecoin Capped No Transferable Consensus None DL
28 Bitcoin [69] Bitcoin Capped [7] [13] No Transferable Consensus [7] [21] None DL [2]
29 Ardor [70] Ardor Capped No Transferable None All DL, Consensus
The survey is divided into two parts. The first part lets
participants evaluate the classification of their system while
the second part acquires feedback on the structure of the
taxonomy.
A. Demographics
Table VII illustrates the demographics of the survey, in
particular, the distribution of participants among the DLT
systems, their specific roles and experience. It shows that
the participants are involved in 19 out of the 29 systems
of the classification. Twelve developers participated in the
survey of which 7 are core/team developers. Additionally 9
participants are project leaders. Moreover, 14 participants have
more experience than three years, 16 participants work one to
three years and 6 participants work shorter than a year in the
field of DLT systems.
B. Classification
In the first part of the survey, the participants are shown the
classification of their DLT system for 18 attributes of the four
components. Consult Figure 2 for an overview of attributes10
and Tables III, IV, V, VI for the rated classifications.
The participants have the option to agree, disagree or state
that they are uncertain about the classification. They always
have the chance to comment on their decision, irrespective of
their choice.
Figure 3(a) depicts the aggregated rating of the components.
The distributed ledger component has the highest approval
with 90.5%, followed by action (85.6%), consensus (80.6%)
and token (77.2%).
In the original version of the classification received by
participants and illustrated in the Supplementary Material, the
underlying attribute is split into on-chain and off-chain under-
lying. These attributes have more fine grained characteristics
(e.g. Computation, Storage, Identity) than the one used in the
final classification as explained in Section VI-C.
Figure 4 shows the approval ratings for each attribute of
the four components. One notices, that all approval ratings
are above 74%, except on-chain underlying (50.0%) and off-
10Please note, that the number of attributes presented to the survey
participants differ from the final number of attributes. The reasoning for this
is explained at the end of this Section
TABLE VII
SURVEY PARTICIPANTS PER DLT SYSTEM, THEIR SPECIFIC ROLES AND
EXPERIENCE
DLT system Total
Aragon 2
Ardor 2
Bitcoin 1
Blockstack 1
Byteball 1
Corda 2
Counterparty 1
Dash 6
Ethereum 1
Factom 1
Golem 1
Hyperledger (Fabric) 4
IOTA 3
Monero 4
Namecoin 1
Siacoin 1
Stellar 1
Storj 1
Zcash 2
Total 36
Role in Project Total
Project Lead 9
Core/Team Developer 7
Team Member 6
Advisor 1
Community Developer 5
Community Member 2
Other 6
Total 36
Experience Total
> 3 years 14
1-3 years 16
< 1 year 6
Total 36
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Fig. 3. Rating of the classification and expressiveness of taxonomy compo-
nents as perceived by survey participants
chain underlying (66.7%). Five attributes are above 90%:
address traceability (100%), origin (94.4%), actor permission
(93.3%), conditional creation (93.3%) and unconditional cre-
ation (93.3%).
Figure 4 shows, that the highest disagreements are ob-
served with on-chain underlying (30.0%), validator permission
(19.4%) and off-chain underlying (13.3%). The highest uncer-
tainty is found with on-chain and off-chain underlying (each
20.0%), consensus type (19.4%), read permission (13.3%) and
burn property (13.3%).
Having a detailed look at the comments provided by the
participants who disagreed with the classification of the on-
chain underlying, one notices the following11: On-chain stor-
age of hashes is not seen as storage by participants (22.2%).
11In brackets are depicted the percentage for which this responds type
accounts to the overall disagreements. Please note, that the percentages do
not add up to 100% as a survey participant could state several reasons for
disagreement
For some systems, contradicting comments of the participants
for the on-chain value of the systems token are stated (11.1%).
Some participants mixed up the on-chain underlying of the
token with the overall services that the DLT system provides
(22.2%), which not necessarily need to be accessed via the
token. Some participants disagree because the classification
does not consider on-chain underlyings which are expected
to be implemented in the future (33.3%). Other respondents
confused the option to use a token as a currency with its un-
derlying (22.1%). Finally, some mixed up on-chain underlying
with off-chain underlying (11.1%).
Some of those, who answered that they are uncertain, did
not distinguish current implementation of on-chain under-
lyings and future implementations (50.0%), which are not
considered by the classification. Other respondents mixed up
the possibility to use a token as a currency with its underlying
(25.0%). Some identified a misformatted question formulation
(25.0%).
For the off-chain underlying a similar picture can be drawn.
Here, the disagreement and uncertainty answers are combined:
Participants considered past and future off-chain underlyings
and disagreed with the classification (30.0%). Some under-
stood off-chain underlying to be an exclusive right for the
token (10.0%). Moreover, as in the on-chain case, some
participants linked the possibility to use the token as a currency
to its underlying (20.0%). Some participants mixed on-chain
and off-chain value (10.0%), others did not understand the
question (10.0%) or did not respond (20.0%).
To sum up, despite the fact that disagreements and uncer-
tainties are significantly low, the main ones stated are outlined
below:
1) Not distinguishing up on-chain and off-chain underlying
2) Not distinguishing the underlying from services which
can be assessed in the DLT system
3) Mixing up the underlying with the possibility to use a
token as a currency
4) Considering future or past features of the DLT systems
5) Rejecting on-chain storage of hashes as storage
Furthermore, the feedback indicates that survey participants
are in some instances inconsistent with the evaluation of
the classification within a DLT system. For instance, as
stated previously, some survey participants disagreed on the
characteristic of a system’s on-chain underlying. In order
to investigate this further, the weighted consistency averages
for each attribute are depicted in Figure 6. The values are
calculated as follow: Assuming a linear scale for the responses:
0 - disagree, 1 - not sure, 2 - agree, the values are normalized
to take values in the range [0, 1]. Then, for each DLT system
from which more than one response is obtained as illustrated in
Table VII, the consistency of responses is calculated for each
system and attribute with the mean absolute error. Then, the
average for each attribute is obtained by taking the weighted
average of the DLT systems consistency values.
The overall consistency is on average 91.0%. The lowest
consistency is measured for the on-chain and off-chain un-
derlying, correlating with the higher disagreements observed
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earlier. The highest consistencies are noticed for address
traceability, write permission, conditional creation and uncon-
ditional creation.
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Fig. 6. Weighted average of consistency calculation per attribute, using DLT
systems consistency values of which more than one response is obtained
C. Incorporating Blockchain Community Feedback
Motivated by the received feedback, three changes to the
taxonomy are introduced.
First, in order to reduce the ambiguity when it comes to
mixing up on-chain underlyings, off-chain underlyings and
other services in the system and hence addressing point one
and two of the previous summary, a more clear mapping
of the token underlying to the components of the concep-
tual framework (Figure 1) is introduced. For that, the off-
chain and on-chain underlyings are merged into one attribute
and their characteristics are abstracted to take values in the
component of the framework where the underlying resides
on. For instance, in case of the Ethereum token: Instead
of expressing, that the token gives access to the on-chain
underlying computation, the token is now said to provide
access to the distributed ledger, which in turn implies giving
access to computation.
Second, in order to emphasize the possibility to store
arbitrary data on distributed ledgers (e.g hashes), which, for
instance, enables Bitcoin to function as an infrastructure
system, the storage attribute has been added to the distributed
ledger component. This addresses point number five.
Third, in order to address point number three, the transfer-
ability attribute has been added to the token component, which
emphasizes the possibility to use the token as a currency.
Because the classification captures the current state of DLT
systems and not future possible extensions, point number four
is not addressed.
D. Taxonomy
In this second part of the survey, the blockchain community
is asked to evaluate the developed taxonomy. Nickerson et al.
propose five criteria to assess the “usefulness” of a taxonomy
[23]. Namely, a taxonomy is
• concise, if it uses a limited number of attributes and
characteristics,
• robust, if it uses enough attributes and characteristics to
clearly, differentiate the objects of interest
• comprehensive, if it can classify all known objects within
the domain under considerations,
• extensible, if it allows for inclusion of additional dimen-
sions and new characteristics within a dimension when
new types of objects appear,
• explanatory, if it contains object attributes and charac-
teristics that do not model every possible detail of the
objects but, rather, provide useful explanations of the
nature of the objects under study or help to understand
future objects.
The literature review (Section II) reveals an ambiguity in
how many attributes and characteristics should be included
in a taxonomy of DLT systems. Moreover, the classification
considers DLT systems discussed in academic literature, hence
the taxonomy should enable such a classification. Considering
these two points, the taxonomy is evaluated using the robust-
ness and comprehensiveness criteria of Nickerson et al. [23]:
For that, this paper introduce the concept of expressiveness:
Definition 5. A taxonomy is expressive when it is robust and
comprehensive.
The perceived expressiveness of the developed taxonomy
can be determined by asking the survey participants for each
component and attribute:
Question 1. ”How expressive is [component/attribute] to
differentiate between and classify DLT systems”.
This question reveals the concept of expressiveness, com-
prehensiveness and robustness to the survey participants, with
neither exposing them to the theory nor overloading them with
a high number of questions.
Figure 3(b) depicts the expressiveness of the four compo-
nents as perceived by the survey participants. The consensus
component is seen as the most expressive (82.9%), followed by
distributed ledger (80.0%), token (62.9%) and action (54.3%).
The highest uncertainties are measured with the action (34.3%)
and token (28.6%) components. This paper is the first to
introduce an action and a token component, which focuses
on the cryptoeconomic design of a DLT system. The lower
rating of expressiveness of the token and action components
and the significant higher uncertain ratings when compared
to the consensus and distributed ledger component account
for this. In particular, the consensus component is used by
all terminologies found in literature (Section II) and thus
must be familiar to survey participants. Moreover, the action
component consists of the least number of attributes, which
may decrease the perceived expressiveness. In particular, the
reduced number of attributes seems to hinder the differentia-
tion between DLT systems.
Twelve participants comment on the expressiveness of the
components. They state that governance, funding of DLT
systems and the development strategy of the source code
should be included (16.7%). One participant mentions, that
the action component is not expressive enough, because it
lacks attributes which would express the unique features of the
system (8.3%). Similar statements have been formulated for
other components (25.0%). Another participant does not think
that developing a taxonomy for blockchain systems is useful
(8.3%). Finally, some participants made statements endorsing
the construction of the taxonomy (42.7%).
Figure 5 depicts the experessiveness of the 18 attributes.
The four most expressive attributes are actor permission
(76.5%), DL origin (73.5%), address traceability (73.5%) and
write permission (73.5%). Action fee (38.2%), conditional
creation (29.4%) and consensus type (29.4%) raise the highest
uncertainties. The most unexpressive attributes are on/off-
chain underlyings (each 26.5%), burn property (23.5%) and
consensus proof (23.5%). The lower values for the underlyings
are supposedly due to the lower classification ratings. Despite
the action component being the least expressive component,
its attribute of actor permission is rated as the most expressive
and also its other two attributes are among the top-9 most
expressive ones. This strengthens the suggestion to extend the
action component with further attributes.
Figure 6(b) depicts the consistency with which the par-
ticipants evaluated the expressiveness of the taxonomy at-
tributes. Despite normalizing a five point likert scale (0-very
unexpressive, 1-expressive, 2-not sure, 3-expressive, 4-very
expressive) to take values in zero to one, the calculation of
the consistency remains the same as for the classification.
The average consistency over all attributes is 83.7%, meaning
that survey participants of the same DLT system rated the
expressiveness of the taxonomy similar to each other. In
particular, they diverge on average only 16.3% from each
other, which resembles fewer than one choice difference on
the constructed likert-scale. Moreover, one notices, that the
10% confidence intervals overlap for all weighted averages.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper distinguishes cryptoeconomic design from the
distributed ledger and consensus of a DLT system. Based on
this modeling separation, a novel conceptual architecture for
DLT systems is introduced, which in turn allows the construc-
tion of an expressive taxonomy as defined in Section VI-D
based on taxonomy theory and validated by feedback collected
from blockchain community to harvest wisdom of the crowd.
The significance of this approach lies in the fact that, un-
like other compared approaches found in academic literature
(Section II), all taxonomy components (distributed ledger, con-
sensus, action, token) are derived from the architecture. This
justifies and positions the taxonomy components and attributes
as well as motivates their interrelationships. The taxonomy
is then used to reason about yet undefined cryptoeconomic
terminologies, such as permissionless systems or asset tokens
using Boolean Algebra. The latter play an important role for
the swiss financial market authority FINNMA to classify a
token as a security [40].
The effectiveness and applicability of the taxonomy is
then demonstrated by classifying systems found in academic
literature. The fact that 29 of those DLT systems of different
design approaches can be uniquely classified indicates a high
robustness as motivated in earlier taxonomy theory [23] and
discussed in Section VI-D.
The feedback of the blockchain community is studied and
turned into concrete improvement actions applied to the final
proposed taxonomy. In particular, the restructuring of the
underlying attribute improves its conciseness. Moreover, the
feedback further confirms the comprehensiveness and robust-
ness of the taxonomy as shown in Figure 3(b) with a 70%
expressiveness on average and the ones of the classification in
Figure 3(a) with 83% agreement on average.
The results point to different directions for future research.
First, given that the DLT systems are an area of active
research in industry and academia, it is expected that the
conceptual framework can be challenged by new systems,
particularly by system designs diverging from the architectures
that are considered typical at the time of writing this paper,
for instance permissionless blockchain systems with PoW con-
sensus. Particularly, one can further explore the token design
space and conceptualize systems with more than one token,
e.g. the Akasha systems uses several tokens [34]. Second,
the evaluation suggests that the taxonomy can be further
extended with further attributes for the action component,
such as the type of actions, which can be performed in the
system. Moreover, the consensus component can be extended
with a network topology attribute or the underlying attribute
can be restructured into an on-chain and off-chain underlying.
Furthermore, a component modeling inter-token relationships
or the governance of the systems can become a requirement.
Especially the latter can be critical in deciding if a system has a
decentralized organization (e.g. no trusted party). Nevertheless,
it needs to be evaluated how far these extensions affect the
expressiveness or conciseness of the taxonomy. The possibility
of grouping a larger number of DLT systems with similar
attribute characteristics, as demonstrated in Section V (e.g.
permissionless systems), suggests to perform a cluster analysis
on top of the classification accompanied by further large-scale
community feedback.
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